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AbstractAre share units a better compensation tool than stock options? This paper studies the impact of a transition within the compensation structures of CEOs of companies listed on the TSX Composite Index. Specifically, we ask whether replacing options with units‐based compensation reduces the volatility of these companies' stock prices while promoting better returns. Our findings show that a shift to share units reduces large‐cap Canadian companies' total risk through its idiosyncratic component. This transition is also accompanied by an increase in their risk‐adjusted accounting and market performance. This suggests that share units are better for compensation contracts.

PurposeThis paper aims to examine whether the corporate governance rankings published by a market information intermediary are reflected in the values that investors accord to firms.Design/methodology/approachPanel data from 289 Canadian firms in the four‐year period 2002‐2005 were analyzed using a price model.FindingsThe results suggest that the corporate governance rankings published by the market information intermediary are related to not only firm market value, but also to accounting results.Practical implicationsThis study provides empirical observations that would be useful for various organizations involved in the regulation of corporate governance practices and the standardization of relevant data elements.Originality/valueThis study contributes to the literature by demonstrating that information published by an information intermediary is reflected in firm market values. Moreover, this information appears to be related to the accounting results. Thus, good governance rankings are reflected in the accounting results.